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Abstract. Approaches against Phishing can be classified into modifica-
tions of the traditional PIN/TAN-authentication on the one hand and
approaches that try to reduce the probability of a scammer being success-
ful without changing the existing PIN/TAN-method on the other hand.
We present a new approach, based on challenge-response-authentication.
Since our proposal does not require any new hardware on the client side,
it can be implemented with little additional cost by financial institutions
or other web retailers and therefore is a good compromise compared to
the other approaches. A big drawback is that it doesn’t protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks but most of the other approaches don’t either.
1 Introduction
Phishing – “the hottest, and most troubling, new scam on the Internet” [1]
– is a relatively new fraud technique, utilizing methods of Social Engineering.
The ”victim”, an online customer, is tricked into divulging personal data (e.g.
passwords, credit card number or online banking account) to an attacker. In
1996 the term Phishing – a combination of ”password” and ”fishing” – was first
mentioned on the internet in the alt.2600 hacker newsgroup. See [2] for further
information.
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), an association of financial in-
stitutions, internet service providers, online-retailers, and other it-companies, is
collecting information on Phishing incidents. The collected data is published in
the monthly Phishing Activity Trends Report, which clearly shows the dramati-
cal increase in Phishing attacks during the last few months (see Fig. 1). Another
study conducted by Gartner showed that 57 million US citizens have already
been victims of a Phishing attack. 1.4 million or 2.5% of them passed sensitive
data unknowingly to third parties which cost banks and credit card companies
$ 1.2 billion in 2003 [4]. According to the APWG-data even 5% of the attacked
are supposed to become victims.
Timeline of a Phishing Attack. According to [5] there is a characteristic proce-
dure:
1. In most cases the attack begins with an email that pretends to come from
a reputable service provider like a bank. At the first glance the fraudulent
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Fig. 1. Active Reported Phishing Sites by Week October 2004-January 2005 [3]
email looks reliable regarding its sender, form, and content and is thus almost
indinstinguishable from a real one. Frequently a necessary update, a loss of
data or even a security problem is the pretended reason for the mail.
2. With the email the victim is tricked in following a hyperlink to a counter-
feited website. Like the initial email this website is hardly to identify as an
imitation, because its look and feel is adapted to that of the original one.
The target of the hyperlink within the email can easily be counterfeited
using html-mails. There are several methods to disguise the address in the
address-field of the browser, like:
– Using a similar domain-name (e.g. https://www.postbank-deutschland.
com instead of https://www.postbank.de)
– Exploiting bugs in the browser software (e.g. using long addresses con-
taining the @ character)
– Using sophisticated methods like ”Floating Windows” – small Java
Script programs that overlap the original address-field of the browser
(containing the address of the scammer’s website) with another window
containing the pretended address.
3. The faked website asks for personal data or access information from the user
that is then used for fraudulent transactions.
The tricks and methods of the Phisher become technically more and more
sophisticated what makes them also more dangerous for the victims. A recent
example is a Phishing email containing scripting code that is used to manipulate
the hosts-file of windows-machines [6]. Since this file is used for the resolution of
domain-names the user is automatically redirected towards the attackers page
when he enters the original URL of the service. It is noteworthy that with this
type of attack the content of the fraudulent email does not necessarily have to
have any relation to the later target, what makes the user even more careless.
This type of attack is also known as ”Pharming”.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we present known
countermeasures against Phishing (Sect. 2). We continue by proposing a new
solution to the problem (Sect. 3) and finally we evaluate our approach and
compare it to the existing ones.
2 Known Countermeasures
Meanwhile there are a lot of protection mechanisms against Phishing and online-
scammers. These proposals can roughly be separated into two categories: modifi-
cations of the traditional authentication and authorisation-method (PIN/TAN)
on the one hand (Sect. 2.2) and approaches that try to reduce the probability of
a scammer being successful without changing the procedure on the other hand
(Sect. 2.1).
2.1 Minimizing the Risks
This group can be divided into user-dependent and user-independent approaches.
User-Dependent Approaches. Most user-dependent approaches are based
on a kind of guideline that is given to the users and contains information about
the correct usage of the service. The complexity of those guidelines is varying
heavily. Some examples are [5], [7], and [1]. The problem with these guidelines
is that the average Internet user is likely not to put into practice all of those
recommendations – either because he is not capable of doing so or for convenience
reasons. Tools can support the user in terms of security.
Spam-Filters and Filters for Outgoing Data. Manufacturers of anti-virus soft-
ware try to hamper Phishing by the use of filters. Already known Phishing mails
and faked hyperlinks can be identified and the corresponding email can be clas-
sified as spam. Filtering Software is also capable of scanning the outgoing traffic
for sensitive data, blocking it and immediately sending a notification to the user.
Browser Plug-Ins. Browser plug-ins like SpoofStick make it easy to verify the
URL of the currently visited website. The plug-in-software shows the name of the
currently displayed website in a user-configurable color and size (e.g. ”You’re on
ebay.com”). This is an effective countermeasure against attacks aiming to confuse
the user by modifying the address-bar.
The plug-ins ScamBlocker, TrustWatch and Phish Net all use blacklists with
well-known Phishing-sites. Everytime the user wants to visit a website it is com-
pared to the list and in case of a match a warning is displayed to the user.
Additionally Phish Net prevents any kind of navigation through the elements of
that site. The software also stores sensitive user data and issues a notification
to the user every time such data should be transmitted via the Internet.
SpoofGuard visualizes its classification of a website by a traffic light (see Fig.
2) and if necessary a pop-up-window with a warning. The classification depends
on various indicators that can be invidually assessed by the user. For further
information see [8].
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Fig. 2. SpoofGuard
Another tool from the developers of SpoofGuard is PwdHash, an Internet
Explorer plug-in, that computes a hash value from the domain-name of the
currently visited website and the password entered in the password field of the
site. Instead of the password chosen by the user the hash value is transmitted
to the website. Thus the ”passwords” (read hashes) transmitted are different for
all domains and a scammer will not get the right password for another domain
by luring the user to a faked domain.
User-Independent Approaches. All tools mentioned above have to be in-
stalled manually by the user. The service provider has no influence on the (cor-
rect) usage of these security measures. In contrast the methods illustrated in the
following can be implemented solely by the service provider.
Spam-Trap and Domain-Watch. Spam-Trap and Domain-Watch are two differ-
ent approaches that aim on informing the service provider at an early stage of
an attack. Then he is able to give a warning to his customers early enough to
protect them.
– For Spam-Trap email-addresses are dropped in numerous newsgroups, guest-
books and websites with the goal to get as many spam-mails as possible to
that addresses. The incoming emails are subsequently analyzed and if a new
Phishing attack is identified the affected service provider is notified.
– Domain-Watch monitors the registration of new domain-names. Every time
a domain with a name similar to that of an existing service provider is reg-
istered a notification is sent. By this means the service provider can prepare
the suspension of that domain in case of an attack. According to [3], the time
domains used for Phishing attacks were reachable and working, averages 5.8
days. By identifying the owner of that domain before the attack begins, the
service provider is able to considerably shorten that time-period and may
even be able to prevent the attack.
Meanwhile there are a couple of firms that monitor spam and domain-regis-
trations for other firms (see [9]). They even offer countermeasures for the case of
emergency that can go as far as denial-of-service attacks on identified Phishing
sites.
Validation of Sender Information. Sender-validation-techniques are designed to
identify spam and Phishing emails respectively to determine their real originator.
According to [10] all currently available techniques are based on an extension of
the mailserver-entries in the DNS.
24 K. Plo¨ssl, H. Federrath, and T. Nowey
Although there are several proposals for the technical realisation a common
standard has not yet been realized. The IETF working group MARID (MTA
AuthorizationRecords in DNS) announced its dissolution in September 2004,
after a controversy over patent claims of Microsoft Corp. concerning the ”Sender
ID” method, which was the favoured method of the working group up to that
point [11]. Now the different proposals are supposed to be submitted as individual
RFC-drafts to the IETF.
Fraud Detection. Major enterprises normally have the ability to analyze all data
for irregularities in real time. Such irregularities can usually be observed when a
scammer tries to use information obtained by a phishing attack for a transaction.
The Internet Payment Service PayPal uses a 24/7 fraud and spoof detection
system, that is capable of identifying anomalous transactions within one hour.
Each transaction is checked for plausibility (amount, frequency of usage, etc.)
and can be revoked if necessary [9].
2.2 Variations of the Authorization and Authentication Procedure
The approaches described so far are either user-dependent, not yet available (val-
idation of sender information) or merely supporting measures (Fraud Detection,
Spam Trap and Domain Watch). For reasons like carelessness and ignorance of
the users a solution to the problem cannot solely rely on user behaviour. Further-
more a solution should be available soon. The supporting measures alone cannot
prevent Phishing, they are just a possibility to quickly react on attacks. Thus
the only way to effectively solve the problem is to use methods that change the
existing PIN/TAN procedure for authentication and authorization. Therefore we
focus on that kind of approach for the remainder of the paper.
Hardware Tokens. The PIN/TAN-procedure is replaced by a small piece of hard-
ware (hardware token) that is given to all users and that can be used to generate
one-time-passwords.
– According to [12] AOL uses RSA Security’s SecurID hardware token. In
order to log in, users have to type in a 6-digit-Code displayed by the token
and changed every minute, in addition to their regular password.
– A one-time-password token provided by Kobil Systems does not change the
passwords periodically but on user request. Every time the user needs a
password he has to push a button on the token [13].
– A third method is used by the Swedish SEB-bank. It uses a token-based
challenge-response-system [14]. When logging into the bank website with his
ID the user activates his hardware token by entering a PIN. He is shown a
challenge that he has to enter in his token. The response (that is only valid
for 30 seconds) is then computed by the token and has to be transmitted to
the website by the user.
PKI and Digital Signature. When using a Public-Key-Infrastructure (PKI) the
user usually gets a key pair and a certificate guaranteeing the authenticity of
his public key. A time stamp and a digital signature is then added to every
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request sent to the service provider. The service provider can subsequently verify
the request by using the users public key. Thus this approach can guarantee
authenticity and integrity of the transmitted data if the private keys are kept
absolutely confidential and the mapping between a party and its public key is
correct. Usually the private key is stored on a smartcard that is protected from
unauthorized access by a PIN. For the effectiveness of the time-stamp the clocks
of the participating parties should be synchronized.
3 New Proposal
The mechanisms against Phishing shown in the previous sections either need
proper behaviour of the user or additional soft- or hardware. But equipping
all users with additional soft- and/or hardware can be very costly and there
are additional costs associated with installation and user support. Therefore we
propose a new procedure that avoids additional hardware.
3.1 How it Works
The new proposal is mainly the combination of the known PIN/TAN-approach
with a paper-based challenge-response-technique. It differs from PIN/TAN in
the way that the user gets a list with challenge-response-pairs instead of a list
with TANs. Before completing a transaction a challenge is presented to the
user who must enter the corresponding response. If the response is incorrect the
transaction is not carried out.
If the new technique should (also) be used for access control the user has to
enter his ID and then sees a challenge from his list (see Fig. 3). If he enters the
correct response he is granted access. If he finally wants to carry out a transaction
he has to complete the challenge-response procedure again.
Please type in the response to challengecorresponding
637 289 xnm
Fig. 3. Challenge-Response Input-Screen
Any challenge is sent to the user only once regardless of the fact if the re-
sponse was correct or not. If nearly all challenges of the list are used the user
gets a new list. After a predefined number of failed attempts to enter the correct
response (e.g. three) the user should be notified and his account should be locked
(at least temporary). To complicate man-in-the-middle attacks it is reasonable
to limit the validity of the challenge to a short period of time so that the attacker
only has little time available to act.
The usability is increased if challenge and response are clearly distinguish-
able. This could be achieved by using a sequence of numbers as challenge and a
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Fig. 4. Challenge-Response-List
sequence of letters as response. Additionally such a challenge is very easy to find
in an ordered list. To prevent attacks that ask the user to give away a challenge
with the corresponding response the challenge should include some symbols that
simply can’t be keyed in (see Fig. 4, symbols taken from the Ewok language). If
challenge and response are constructed like shown in Fig. 4 the probability for
an attacker to guess the corresponding response to a given challenge is approxi-
mately 1 to 308 millions. Crossing out used pairs is not necessary but it can be
done to keep the look and feel of the traditional TAN lists.
[15] states that it is a major problem that TAN-lists can easily be copied
without the kowledge of the user. He solves this problem by adding a physical
layer that has to be scratched away before the user can see the TAN. This
approach has two drawbacks:
1. The user always has to carry along the list to be able to conduct a transaction
what may result in destroying the physical layer accidentially.
2. In some cases the user may actually want to copy the list, e.g. if he has two
residences and doesn’t want to sway the list between these.
We propose to employ visual cryptography to solve this problem. The user
then gets a sheet of paper and a transparency that he has to keep on two different
places. When carrying out a transaction he has to combine these two things to
be able to see the challenge-response-pairs. Thus on the one hand the legitimate
user can still copy the two things easily, but on the other hand for an adversary
it is much more difficult to get the two duplicates unnoticed than just copying
one list. In short: employing visual cryptography doesn’t protect against copying
the list but complicates this process for an attacker.
3.2 Evaluation
The new proposal is evaluated according to the criteria in [16]. Thus it’s eas-
ily possible to compare it with the PIN/TAN-alternatives evaluated there. [16]
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uses a long list of criteria that is limited to the one’s relevant for Phishing in
this paper. These are the main criterions security, user acceptance and costs.
Additionally this paper introduces the criterion ”Protection against Phishing”.
The token based approaches have also been included in the evaluation. Table 1
summarizes the results. Following [16] ++ stands for very good, + for good, ∼ for
average, - for substandard and -- for not good.
The currently used passwords and TANs provide no protection against Phish-
ing at all. In contrast using PKI and digital signatures has the potential to
protect against Phishing completely because the digitally signed (order-)data
cannot be modified unnoticed provided that the user really signs his data (e.g.
by using an external tamper-proof signing hardware with data visualisation).
As for hardware tokens there are slight differences in the protection against
Phishing depending on the option used: If the one-time-password is changed
periodically the scammer has to carry out a man-in-the-middle attack to be
able to (mis-)use a grifted password. If the token computes a time independent
password on demand of the user he can usually use the password(s) till the
victim logs on to the real website again.
The new proposal protects better against Phishing than a method based on
the latter type of tokens because the scammer needs the correct response to
a specific challenge. And since any challenge is sent to the user only once the
scammer cannot get a pool of challenges to trick the user. It is only possible to
implement a man-in-the-middle attack. Thus the new proposal proctects against
Phishing in nearly the same manner as tokens that generate one-time-passwords
periodically.
Paper based lists like the ones used in the new proposal are very reliable but
they could be misplaced, stolen or copied. By employing visual cryptography
unnoticed copying can be made very difficult. Hardware tokens may – besides of
being stolen or misplaced – stop working because of power breakdown or external
forces.
There is no installation effort for the user neither with hardware tokens nor
with paper based challenge-response-lists. Both alternatives are easy to use but
the new proposal seems more applicable than the use of hardware tokens because
it works more like the well known PIN/TAN-authentication.
Regarding the criterion wide user spectrum the approaches are similar to
passwords. For any new service the user needs a new token or a new list and any
method can be used for other applications like authentication at an ATM. The
transparency of the methods is very high because the user always knows what
he has to do and why. He can completely control what he wants to enter.
The software costs for the two alternatives are low. The new proposal just
requires an extension of the PIN/TAN-authentication module that can easily
be implemented in most cases. If tokens are used a new authentication module
must be implemented or integrated into the system.
There are no additional hardware costs for the new proposal. Just the lists
have to be printed but this is similar to the PIN/TAN-method. Due to the
similarity to the well known PIN/TAN-approach the training costs are low. The
28 K. Plo¨ssl, H. Federrath, and T. Nowey
Table 1. Evaluation of PIN/TAN alternatives from [16], own evaluations in italic
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Password -- ∼ + + + + + + + -
New proposal + ++ ++ ++ + ++ + + + +
Token: Password periodical + + ++ + + ++ + - ∼ +
Token: Password on demand ∼ + ++ + + ++ + - ∼ +
PKI with smart card support ++ + + ++ ++ ++ - - ∼ ∼
administration costs are likely to be lower than for traditional passwords because
the users can’t forget their passwords any more.
In contrast the token based methods are quite expensive because every user
has to get his own token. Also the costs for training and administration are
higher than for password based methods because the users have to be taught
how to use the tokens.
4 Summary
Reliable protection against Phishing can not be achieved with the existing pass-
word and PIN/TAN-mechanism. Thus this method has to be changed to some
degree. Using digital signatures is the best solution in terms of security. Unfor-
tunately there are a lot of additional costs for necessary hardware, user training,
support, PKI, and so on. Another drawback is that the user is no longer highly
mobile because most solutions require a card reader plugged into the PC and the
necessary drivers. But in many cases plugging hardware into a PC and installing
drivers is nearly impossible e.g. on a journey in an Internet Cafe.
Using hardware tokens with periodically changing one-time-passwords is also
a reliable protection against Phishing. But this alternative causes a lot of addi-
tional costs for hardware, user training, and support, too. These are lower than
the costs associated with using digital signatures but not neglectable. In addition
the users won’t be willing to take a unique hardware token with them for every
service they use.
The new paper-based challenge-response-approach suggested in this paper
seems to be a good compromise between security and costs because it protects
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nearly as reliable against Phishing as hardware tokens while causing consider-
ably lower costs. The major drawback is that it doesn’t protect against man-
in-the-middle attacks but this is also true for the alternatives that employ the
mentioned hardware tokens. Due to the similarity to the well known PIN/TAN-
authentication the additional costs for user training and support are very low.
The user’s mobility is nearly the same as before, he just needs a single sheet (and
probably a transparency) with the challenge-response-pairs for every service he
wants to use.
The paper shows that there are many reasonable mechanisms to protect
against Phishing. They just have to be implemented by financial institutions,
web retailers and other service providers.
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